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Conceptual Metaphors of Anger 







George Eliot’s Middlemarch is replete with conceptual metaphors, many of 
which are familiar and carry deep emotional resonance. The recurrence of 
widespread and broadly familiar conceptual metaphors in this influential 
novel suggest them to be a major characteristic feature of Eliot’s technique. 
This figurative manner of expression is both a signature discursive structure 
constituting part of the formal properties of the text’s realist aesthetics, and 
also an indication of Eliot’s intuitive creativity at work: her capacity to 
produce a familiar sensation via conventional language structures. Part of 
this reliance on metaphor arises from the established conventions in which 
Eliot works. The nineteenth-century realistic novel preserves, and highlights, 
a subconscious, normalized linguistic regularity, and therefore draws 
attention to itself as a genre that establishes its essential distinctiveness, to a 
considerable degree, through the cultivation and foregrounding of its 
metaphoric conventionality.  
 
Such orthodoxy of expression is not only a matter of habit, but is also 
experiential, in that metaphors can become conventional because they reflect 
the embodied experience of being in the world. For example, in 
Middlemarch, the prototypical figurative model of anger, one of the most 
evidently embodied emotions, which Eliot extends in original ways, usually 
has its basis in ‘the universal embodiment of anger’.1 Its external 
                                                 
1 Kövecses, ‘Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger: A Psycholinguistic Analysis,’ 
157. 




manifestation therefore is in recognizable facial,2 gestural,3 and vocal 
expressions.4 The linguistically-revealed embodiment of the novelistic 
discourse of anger is contended here to be a re-enactment of a cluster of 
beliefs about properties of anger. They are characterized, on the one hand, 
physiologically by ‘muscle tension, general restlessness, an increase in heart 
rate and the face feeling hot’;5 and on the other hand, behaviourally by ‘self-
assertion, ranging from statements of appropriate self-assertion and defense 
of one’s self to harmful aggressive actions’,6 impaired judgement,7 and also 
a tendency to ‘lose self-control and to act on impulse and without 
reflection’.8 The broad understanding of anger in terms of different, but 
familiar, kinds of natural response patterns leads to the assumption that the 
origin of anger metaphors in Middlemarch resides in the way people are 
biologically hard-wired to react to anger-eliciting events. Because novelistic 
discourse comes to rely on pervasive conventional metaphors, many of 
which express embodied emotion, such expressions become an identifiable 
                                                 
2 Darwin first suggested (The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals) and 
modern authority on facial behaviour seems to agree (Ekman, Friesen and 
Ellsworth [Emotion in the Human Face]; Ekman [Emotions Revealed]; and Izard 
[The Face of Emotion; Human Emotions]) that basic emotions (such as joy, anger, 
fear, disgust and sadness) have a reliably recognizable facial signature across 
cultures. 
3 The emblematic gestural expression of anger has been reported to involve ‘an 
impulse to move forward toward the target of anger’, and also a tendency to prepare 
hands with an intention to strike. (Ekman, Emotions Revealed, 135, 26). These 
highly recognizable bodily movements, perceived to be oriented towards inflicting 
harm, ‘show that angry feelings are paralleled by aggression-related motor 
impulses.’ Berkowitz, ‘Anger,’ 425.  
4 One of the most characteristic features of anger recognized across cultures is the 
high-pitched tone of voice such as that produced during yelling, shouting or 
screaming. Green, Whitney and Gustafson (in ‘Vocal Expressions of Anger’), 
demonstrate that there is a considerable similarity in the ways people vocally 
express anger worldwide. 
For a convincing argument that the vocal expression of emotions is, like facial, 
subject to universal recognition, see also Banse and Scherer, ‘Acoustic Profiles in 
Vocal Emotion Expression.’ 
5 Berkowitz, ‘Anger,’ 412. 
6 Schultz, Grodack and Izard, ‘State and Trait Anger, Fear, and Social Information 
Processing,’ 312. 
7 See, for example, Kolts, 19–20; and also Seneca’s view of anger as inhibiting 
rational faculties, referenced by Spielberger and Reheiser, ‘The Nature and 
Measurement of Anger,’ 404. 
8 Potegal, ‘The Temporal Dynamics of Anger: Phenomena, Processes, and 
Perplexities,’ 386. 




quality of the novel, an integral part of its textual apparatus, instinctively 
deployed as a representational strategy9 and a generic hallmark of that 
expressive mode.  
 
Eliot uses and develops these embodied expressions of anger in new 
and motivated ways, which is to say she deftly experiments with conceptual 
metaphors to drive and bolster a number of salient features of her narrative, 
most typically the social and psychological realities of her characters, whose 
affective worlds are carefully crafted for moral use in the story. But, despite 
this individualistic deployment of conceptual metaphors for anger, Eliot 
nevertheless relies on easily recognizable and distinctly embodied schemas 
which take part in the representation of reality precisely as a result of this 
universal familiarity. It is proposed here that the language of a realistic 
narrative, such as Middlemarch, can be understood in terms of its aptness to 
project coherent patterns of embodied experience imprinted on the (English-
speaking) mind. In turn, such a novel can be seen as a cultural map of 
embodied emotional experience—a particularly useful resource for the 
reconstruction of mental representations of enduring anger concepts.  
 
In order to explore this line of inquiry, this article will examine 
conceptual metaphors used by Eliot to express anger. The consistency of 
conceptual metaphors of anger in Middlemarch suggests a non-coincidental 
and non-trivial conceptualization of this emotion that arises from the 
perceived symptoms of embodied anger—the involuntary mounting of 
bodily heat proportionate to the experienced intensity of the emotion. When 
mimetic instances of the experience of anger are communicated, the actual 
physiology of anger seems to influence Eliot’s cognition, or to prime it—
and probably other writers’ too, given the particularly strong biological basis 
of this emotion—to conceive of anger characteristically as that which, like 
temperature itself, has the potential to rise and fall. This mentally rehearsed 
property of anger is in turn intuitively expected to guide the linguistic 
representation of this emotion, offering an indication of the way the 
Victorians metaphorically created, and were controlled by, an emotional 
reality, structured by these biological patterns. In other words, Eliot tends to 
use figurative language that configures a typically angry person to have 
features similar to that of a container under pressure, capable of retaining 
                                                 
9 Conceptual metaphors, according to the influential theory of Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980), are the product of a cognitive processing that functions in ways that we are 
largely unconscious of. Turner succinctly expresses this idea: ‘Constructions have 
intricate structure and systematic principles that we know intuitively but not 
consciously.’ (‘Figure,’ 58). 




accumulated energy up to the critical release point. The embodied 
conceptual metaphor here is that a person is a pressurized container, and in 
turn, anger is imagined as the heated fluid in the container that expands and 
causes the pressure to rise. 
 
The recognition of the very conventional nature of such habitual forms 
of expression might lead to the conception of a literary creativity that is of 
relatively limited conceptual potential, where the metaphorical 
representation of mental states is more or less restricted by a consistently 
mechanistic, physiologically-based imagination. The principle of conceptual 
restriction to which the novel adheres is the consequence not only of 
automatic bodily responses, but also of the ways of thinking that have 
become customary both within a particular cultural situation, and also in an 
individual mind. But along with this inherent conceptual limitation of 
novelistic discourse comes its particularly persuasive power. When readers 
recognize the basic metaphorical conceptualization of an emotion—its 
representative ‘image schema’—they are automatically involved in the 
associated meanings that this conceptualization engenders, and hence are 
more readily inclined to accept, and even be guided, by them.10 Conventional 
conceptual metaphors can thereby be rhetorically deployed specifically for 
didactic purposes. As Victorian writers used novels, amongst other implicit 
purposes, as a vehicle for reflecting and even encouraging high standards of 
conduct, a recourse to conceptual metaphor was a key linguistic strategy for 
the endorsement of the ethic of self-regulation and the concomitant 
promulgation of the disparagement of excessively fiery behaviour, an aim 
encoded in Eliot’s linguistic choices. 
 
The narrative tendency to reflect the embodiment of emotions through 
the pervasive use of figurative language does not, however, equate to a denial 
of Eliot’s creative engagement, or detract in any way from the accepted 
literary brilliance of Middlemarch. Scholars of Eliot’s oeuvre have invested 
much of their critical energy in examining her masterful and original use of 
metaphor (the early experimentation with which appears in her religious 
letters as the young Mary Anne Evans11). It would be hard to dispute Jan 
Jędrzejewski’s evaluation of Middlemarch as a text whose unity of design is 
uniquely dependent for its success on consciously contrived figurative 
ensembles:  
 
                                                 
10 On ‘image schema’, see Turner, ‘Figure,’ esp. his discussion of the concept of 
‘iconicity,’ 49–51. 
11 See Henry, 3. 




The immense diversity of themes and motifs that constitute the 
world of Middlemarch is held together by elaborate patterns of 
imagery integrating all elements of the novel and functioning on 
a number of levels, from individual, localized metaphors and 
similes embedded in the texture of George Eliot’s prose to 
broader symbolic structures of the plot and characterization.12  
 
Eliot’s use of metaphors and imagery, across time and space, has been 
studied in terms of their complexity, scope,13 and also with reference to ‘how 
they function as a compressed form of exposition’,14 thereby establishing 
their relevance to the composite of narrative method. The perceived finesse 
and calculated unity of her linguistic representation, a discursive technique 
of levels of quality attributed to Shakespeare,15 long ago provoked Barbara 
Hardy to form the conclusion that her creative language reflects an artistic 
meticulousness which ‘we are more willing to give to the medium of poetry 
than to the medium of the prose narrative’.16  
 
Eliot’s metaphors, more often than not, seem to be the result of a 
deliberate demand for stylistic perfection, but when Eliot famously labours 
to sustain the visual image of Dorothea’s marriage in terms of motifs of 
confinement,17 or when she consistently configures Maggie’s conflicts of 
                                                 
12 Jędrzejewski, 77. 
13 For example, for an excellent discussion of Eliot’s intricate metaphorical 
weavings in Middlemarch and other novels, see Hardy, George Eliot: A Critic’s 
Biography, esp. Chapter 6, ‘Objects, Words and Metaphors,’ 147–64. Paxman 
makes a convincing case for the way the linguistic significance of knowledge 
metaphors in Middlemarch can be broadened when supplemented by a 
consideration of the novel as inseparable from mechanisms of the cognitive system. 
(‘Metaphor and Knowledge in George Eliot’s Middlemarch’). 
14 Gorbunova references B. R. Naptsok’s dissertation (1997) to give an example of 
an increased focus of Russian literary scholars on Eliot’s artistic technique. 
Gorbunova, ‘George Eliot in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia (1917–
2014),’ 282. 
15 Images of the mirror and the labyrinth in Middlemarch are the ones most 
energetically interpreted. 
16 Hardy, ‘Imagery in George Eliot’s Last Novels,’ 14. 
17 On how metaphors and metonymies of imprisonment figure in literary texts, 
amongst them in George Eliot’s ‘Janet’s Repentance,’ Scenes of Clerical Life and 
Felix Holt, see Fludernik, ‘The Metaphorics and Metonymics of Carcerality.’ The 
association of marriage with enclosure is supplied, at least in part, by the female 
experience of living within the restricting confines of Victorian patriarchy. 
Fludernik argues that, through the traditional metaphor ‘MARRIAGE AS PRISON’, 




emotions and ultimate destiny as running parallel with the flow of the river 
in The Mill on the Floss,18 the figurative threads indicate more than their 
thematic significance; articulate more than wider social and psychological 
issues with which Eliot was engaging; and disclose more than that ‘fertility 
of invention characteristic of the best Victorian fiction’.19 Rather, they 
register linguistic instantiations of shared, deep-seated cultural models of 
concepts and ordinary ways of thinking about them. Eliot’s creation of these 
analogies might have a poetic dimension, but it also has a commonplace 
source of origin. Dorothea’s and Maggie’s mental struggles are 
metaphorically anchored in basic figurative expressions that ‘are part of 
those conceptual resources, part of the way members of a culture make sense 
of the world’.20 The characters’ psychological condition is imaginatively 
enacted fundamentally via extremely typical conventional metaphors: 
respectively, marriage is a prison and life is a river. These conventional 
metaphors function as a conceptual prime, and as such exert a profound 
influence on the limits in terms of which concepts such as marriage or life 
can be understood and from which may emerge an immense diversity of 
artistic elaborations. Similar to the creative principle of poetic discourse, 
‘authors may call upon our knowledge of basic conceptual metaphors in 
order to manipulate them in unusual ways’.21 So, although Eliot’s intricately-
spun metaphorical webs are indicative of her contemplated effort to unify 
the recurring images of life and marriage for emotional impact, the 
conceptual templates to which these images continually make reference are, 
in the words of L. David Ritchie, conspicuously flat, unoriginal and already 
                                                 
Wollstonecraft and George Eliot ‘foreground the domination of women by their 
husbands, exposing the trappings of marital felicity as contemptuous fondling (the 
spaniel) or disguised subjection.’ (241). In support of this idea, I would recommend 
reading Tadlock’s brief essay on boredom as arising in marriage from ‘the 
confinement that comes as a result of conforming to the feminine sphere.’ 
(‘Boredom and Marriage in George Eliot’s Middlemarch,’ 82). 
18 On this point, see Rubin, ‘River Imagery as a Means of Foreshadowing in The 
Mill on the Floss’ and also Makurath Jr., ‘The Symbolism of the Flood in Eliot’s 
Mill on the Floss.’ Sadrin (in ‘Time, Tense, Weather in Three ‘Flood Novels’’) has 
made a different observation with respect to the metaphoric function of the flood. 
Unlike in Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, where ‘A simple allusion to the Flood can be 
a short-cut to a tragic dénouement or a means of solemnizing events that otherwise 
would appear as mere accidents’ (98), water deluge in The Mill on the Floss is 
perceived more as ‘a means for the novelist of preventing the future of the heroine 
from being too disastrous.’ (103–4). 
19 Bennett, 162.  
20 Lakoff and Turner, 26. 
21 Ibid., 54. 




absorbed.22 Considerations of how the traditional metaphors in Eliot’s novel 
have a conceptual core prompt speculation and reflection upon the scope and 
limitations of narrative imagination, and have profound implications for 
thinking about the importance of conceptual metaphor in revising the list of 
generic features of realist aesthetics. But the novel is not thought to 
distinguish itself from other literary forms fundamentally due to the 
connection it establishes between conventional metaphoric language and 
realist representation; the point is rather that any theory of literary realism 
can be developed and nuanced by acknowledging the fact that this 
connection exists and that it typifies the genre.  
 
Literary scholars who work on metaphors in literary texts have tended 
to focus on a combination of metaphor and literary theories, and their 
analyses have fruitfully functioned to trace in literary discourse—whether 
poetry or prose—either a particular imaginative use of language, or a 
tendency of the literary text to display an intrinsic figurative stagnation. 
What has been achieved, as a result of these cognitive-linguistic ventures, is 
a fairly flexible methodology capable of accommodating, and often 
reconciling, competing insights from Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
variously utilized to comment on the potential of literature to make manifest 
mental models that fundamentally underlie all creativity. In this context, this 
article has a double scope. Firstly, it participates in an ongoing cognitivist 
project of theorizing metaphor as a basis of human understanding, by 
providing textual evidence for the claim that the structure of literary 
language reflects an inventory of conceptual schemas that the reader 
automatically and effortlessly activates to comprehend metaphorically 
encoded information about the experience of fictional emotions. And 
secondly, it puts forward an argument that is of particular value in the highly 
specialized field of narrative realism: that conceptual metaphor has a special 
prominence in realistic prose as a representational strategy that is both 
characteristic of the genre and also acts as a structured and highly powerful 
vehicle for driving narrative meaning. 
 
When talking about the pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor in the 
novel, it is important not to draw any simple analogies between the actual 
language that we ordinarily speak and the literary language. Conceptual 
metaphors of anger like those deployed by Eliot in Middlemarch are 
products of artistic construction in the sense that they are always subject to 
the author’s aesthetic and rhetorical choices, and as such they always 
                                                 
22 Ritchie, 1–13. 




necessarily belong in the linguistic texture of the narrative. The literary 
context thus can only be expected to betray ‘an authorial presence . . . that 
attunes the reader’s attention to what is written, mirroring the authorial 
attention to detail and structure. The literary artefact is highly intentional, 
and this makes a difference for the reading experience’.23 On the other hand, 
although the intentionality of the language used entails an increased artistic 
assiduity and highlights its concomitant interest in its own creative 
reception,24 the linguistic impulse of the novel is not towards idiosyncrasy 
of expression. Eliot did not reach out for her metaphors from the depths of 
her creative mind to foreground her originality by dotting her novelistic 
landscape with linguistic quirks; rather, she used metaphoric language 
subconsciously, retrieved from a pool of already existing conceptualizations 
of emotions and modes of cognition, grounded ‘in patterns of what we take 
to be habitual and routine experience, both biological and social, that [she 
knew] unconsciously and in rich interactional detail, because [she lived] 
these patterns’.25 This recognition enforces the idea that realist discourse is 
not entirely the product of a type of imaginative thinking that is distinctly 
innovative, but is rather motivated, to a large extent, by the physiological 
and socio-cultural facts of our human existence encoded in everyday 
metaphors. 
 
The metaphorical language of the novel can be analyzed in a similar 
way as figurative expressions that occur in real speech, because cognitive 
interpretive abilities that readers activate to process narrative metaphors 
(although usually below the horizon of their conscious awareness) emanate 
from readers’ ‘real’ bodily/biological and socio-cultural experience. Thus 
the principle of mimetic construction is linked to a simulated consciousness 
that displays ‘no rupture in experience between perceiving, feeling and 
thinking’.26 One striking instance of the novel’s establishing a link between 
a physiological reaction and a particular, quite standard, metonymic emotion 
image is when Dorothea enrages Casaubon by denouncing his work as 
fruitless during their first quarrel in marriage. After delivering this blow of 
                                                 
23 Brandt and Brandt, ‘Cognitive Poetics and Imagery,’ 125. 
24 Brandt and Brandt offer a comment in this connection to the effect that the more 
pronounced the shadow of an author and the greater artistic enigma of a literary 
text, the stronger the demand for an increased interpretive mobility on the part of 
the reader: ‘A text vested with heightened attention calls for a reading vested with 
heightened attention. The more authorial awareness is present in the text, the more 
worthwhile the reading of it is.’ (‘Cognitive Poetics and Imagery,’ 125).  
25 Lakoff and Turner, 59. 
26 Johnson and Rohrer, ‘We are Live Creatures,’ 22. 




criticism, she notices that his ‘face had a quick angry flush upon it’. He opens 
his reproachful speech with a patronizing tag ‘My love’, and then continues 
‘with irritation reined in by propriety’.27 Here, conceptual metonymy28 calls 
attention to the assumed structure flushing stands for anger, accorded by the 
standard rule of metonymy, as articulated fully by Kövecses.29 An essential 
biological attribute of anger—heat—constitutes a basis for this metonymic 
representation of this emotion. The physiological pattern mentally 
schematizes a human being as resembling a hydraulic pressure system in 
which the temperature of fluids progressively rises and which, upon reaching 
a critical point, has to be violently released. This gradual accumulation of 
energy when in an agitated state allows anger to be linguistically gradated, 
‘from mild irritation or annoyance to intense fury and rage’.30 In the 
subsequent metaphor that features in the passage, irritation is configured as 
held back, with a possible significance to act as a shortcut to cultural 
sanctions against socially inappropriate anger displays. Hence for Eliot to 
metaphorically describe Casaubon’s irritation as consciously inhibited (at 
least insofar as a proper sense of decorum bids him to control his emotion) 
is to attribute to him a virtue of self-restraint, via the metaphor of irritation 
is a horse that needs to be controlled. Presumably, the self is doing that 
controlling in both instances, a conscious suppression that counters the 
unintentional escape of both anger and irritation. The metonymic and 
metaphoric depiction respectively of anger and annoyance is realistic, not 
because it ‘mirrors’ natural emotional behaviours, but because it comes to 
establish a level of believability by immediately making sense in a narrative 
situation, allowing the reader to absorb the conceptual metonymy/metaphor 
instantaneously. It is precisely because of its intuitive preoccupation with 
essentially ‘naturalized’ language (textually reproducing—or imitating—
authentic speech acts that feature ‘spontaneous metaphorical expressions as 
they are encountered in concrete uncontrolled language use’31), that the 
novel is proposed here to take on an agency of realism: it physically records 
the conceptual underpinning of metaphorical language, and betokens the 
way the reader’s mind is naturally hardwired to process that language.  
                                                 
27 Eliot, Middlemarch, 200, hereafter designated as M. As in this example, italics 
will be used to indicate metaphoric/metonymic expressions of anger. 
28 Oster offers a definition: ‘In the lexical approach to the study of emotions, we 
speak of conceptual metonymy when an emotion is represented by its physiological 
effects or by the behavioural reactions it generates.’ (‘Using Corpus Methodology 
for Semantic and Pragmatic Analyses,’ 741). 
29 See Kövecses, Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love. 
30 Spielberger and Reheiser, ‘The Nature and Measurement of Anger,’ 403. 
31 Steen, ‘Identifying Metaphor in Language,’ 386. 





The presumed familiarity of readers with conventional metaphoric 
expression is reflected by their demonstrated ability to understand it. In the 
mindset of the literary reader, the novelist takes for granted their internalized 
metaphorical structures, and is expected to have implicitly invited a 
construction of an analogy between authentic and fictional discourse when 
reading. What is notoriously significant is the organic interrelatedness of a 
fictional (literary) metaphor with the ‘real’ metaphor (that is, produced by 
real people in real life contexts)—there are, the argument holds, cogent 
resemblances between two distinct realms of shared conceptual 
understanding. Narrative realism functions such to take a whole range of 
familiar (and normalized over time) conventional metaphors as input, and to 
construct their mimetic equivalents as output. This cognitive interchange 
makes it possible for the conceptual output to be perceived as input, allowing 
imitative metaphors and metonymies ‘to take the reader a short cut to very 
complex scripts, scenarios and cultural frames which can be evoked with the 
strokes of a brush’.32 The realist novel can thereby catalogue English modes 
of cognition by creating mimetic mental models that account for the life-
likeness it bestows.  
 
A consideration of the novel’s conventional metaphoric language 
allows us to allocate a crucial, if not representative, characteristic of the 
genre that contributes to its reality effect. Such a line of inquiry, moreover, 
permits a consideration, with the assistance of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, 
of how generic realist narrative conventions are transformed and expanded 
upon at a linguistic level, a creative zone that interacts with culturally 
specific image schemas and mental models. One of the recognized cognitive 
exploits of the novel is its ability to invite an emotional response from the 
reader. Several theorists focus the explicit goal of realist fiction to engage 
readers emotionally, each differently addressing the deeper problem, indeed 
the psychological oddity, of how it happens at all that we feel any emotions 
towards characters that we know to be imaginary. Broadly, we can discern 
amongst a variety of approaches two strands. In the first strand, a realist 
narrative has been perceived as engaged in the process of constructing a 
‘sense of character as person’,33 recruiting an emotional connection with the 
fictional character by using the representational technique of presenting the 
imaginary with the plausibility and credibility of the real. Taken as such, 
novels do not contrive to depict characters as though they were real people 
                                                 
32 Fludernik, ‘The Metaphorics and Metonymics of Carcerality,’ 242. 
33 Nash, 14. 




with real emotional instincts, but rather to project human figures with 
personalities, frailties and motivations that correlate closely enough with 
those of the real people to then be taken as such. This evocative capacity of 
the genre conforms to ideas fundamentally encapsulated within the concept 
of what Marie-Laure Ryan has suitably termed ‘embedded narratives’, 
encompassing ‘any story-like representation produced in the mind of a 
character and reproduced in the mind of the reader’,34 which stresses the 
centrality of the novel’s desire to deliver human simulations: ‘intelligent 
beings who produce a variety of mental representations such as beliefs, 
wishes, projections, intents, obligations, dreams, and fantasies’.35 Our 
affective response to fictional characters thus consists in a novelist’s 
construction of humanlike behaviours and emotional states, and the reader 
processing this information as that belonging to ‘persons, real persons’ 
without ever assuming ‘that they are real persons’, in Radford and Weston’s 
configuration.36  
 
The second strand to reading literary emotions has mainly been 
developed to add theoretical weight to the first. Amy Coplan, for example, 
has re-examined and consolidated empirical research on narrative affect to 
resolve the confusion associated with the customary ascription of ‘empathy’ 
towards, or ‘identification’ with, characters of a novel as an indispensable 
component in fictional realism, offering a theoretical adjustment in the form 
of the introduction of a concept known as ‘self-other differentiation’.37 Most 
influential has been her distinction between ‘empathy’ and ‘sympathy’, 
which Radford and Weston probably had in mind when formulating their 
pioneering theory about the potential of the novel to involve the reader into 
its emotional scenarios. For Coplan, ‘sympathy’ is that which ‘involves 
caring about another individual—feeling for another’.38 It is essentially the 
non-’get ‘inside’ the other’39 affiliation with someone who experiences a 
difficult emotional moment. In the case of sympathy, people show ‘concern 
for another’s well-being’ without sharing their emotions. Sympathy is thus 
separated from ‘empathy’, the latter which Coplan defines as the affective 
state that occurs when we ‘take up [another’s] psychological perspective and 
imaginatively experience, to some degree or other, what he or she 
                                                 
34 Ryan, ‘Embedded Narratives and Tellability,’ 320. 
35 Ibid., 320. 
36 Radford and Weston, ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’ 
78. 
37 Coplan, ‘Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fictions,’ 144. 
38 Ibid., 145, italics in original. 
39 Davis, 5. 




experiences’.40 Empathizing with fictional characters thus involves the 
enactment of the characters’ primary condition, ‘by pretending to be in their 
“mental shoe”’,41 whilst simultaneously preserving a separate version of 
one’s own experience—an essentially simulation-oriented theory that does 
not depart far from that of Radford and Weston. 
 
To rationalize fictional emotions as reconstituted real affect (because 
readers recognize fictional characters’ emotions to be like their own, and 
verify them against their own evocative stimuli) has been instrumental in 
strengthening the novel’s claim to be realistic. When we understand that 
connecting fictional language with real-world language of emotion relies on 
conventional metaphorical language to produce an imitative mental state, 
then we discover more about the mechanics of narrative realism. Particularly 
relevant to this project is the emphasis on the role of conceptual metaphor in 
the creation of literary realism, specifically as a result of the universal 
embodied experience that underpins such metaphoric expression. Such 
emphasis can be construed as a response to the appeal of F. Elizabeth Hart 
working in the field of Cognitive Linguistics, who, aware of how 
increasingly sophisticated and multi-pronged the study of literary texts is 
rapidly becoming, insists upon ‘the possible relevance of cognitive 
linguistics to literary studies’,42 recommending an interpretive approach that 
takes advantage of ‘a new, metaphor-centered model of language . . . one 
that situates the subject within its material world both inside and outside the 
text’.43 In other words, insights from Cognitive Linguistics, which Hart 
recognizes particularly valuable in discussions of literary texts, have created 
a window of opportunity to explain how the novel’s recourse to basic, readily 
comprehensible metaphors participates in framing the mechanisms of realist 
aesthetics, technically ‘by positing the nature of language as a cognitive and 
not a transcendental phenomenon, and by showing language to be 
imaginatively embodied’.44  
 
This article has two aims: to de-emphasize the novel’s innovative 
metaphor usage, and to consider its language more as a product of 
experiential cognition that confines meaning to a largely subconscious 
awareness of biological universals—precisely to investigate what makes the 
                                                 
40 Coplan, 143. 
41 Gallese, Ferrari and Umiltà, ‘The Mirror Matching System,’ 36, italics in 
original. 
42 Hart, ‘Cognitive Linguistics,’ 3. 
43 Ibid., 2, italics in original. 
44 Ibid., 2, italics in original. 




realist novel realistic. Thus what I will call ‘embodied realism’, as a mark of 
differentiation from all other existing theories of literary realism, is one that 
acknowledges a discourse that activates reading that switches between two 
levels of awareness: the first—‘bio-(pre)perceptual’—which involves an 
acknowledgement (tacitly but nevertheless) of our own bodily 
responsiveness to an emotional stimuli; and the second—‘narrative-
reflective’—requiring establishing the point of maximal convergence of 
realistic/imagined and probable/real emotional scenarios, and thereby 
reducing the distance between the two ontologically separate worlds. 
Engaged reading derives from an embodied realism that is encoded within 
linguistic form via metaphorical means. Cultural models of emotions 
embedded in conceptual metaphors compel the reader to keep track of the 
embodied nature of their own emotional states, thereby orchestrating an 
empathetic response to fictional characters. Readers are textually cued to 
select from a range of possible emotions the ones that are most appropriate 
to the fictional situation being communicated. This logic precludes 
interpretive misfits and is most appropriate to the fictional situation being 
expressed. Such frameworks are thereby as much signals of particular 
emotions that fictional characters undergo, as organizing procedures for 
rendering them intelligible in a narrative context. 
 
A consideration of the figurative language in Middlemarch aims to 
illuminate how Eliot subconsciously engages with conventional anger 
conceptualizations, in order to communicate to her readers the ethical 
messages of her own social/cultural milieu. In particular, it will be shown 
how Eliot in her aesthetic effort to propagate a concept of anger as a breach 
of etiquette educates her audiences to regulate their angry emotions through 
the metaphorical representation of that regulation as a laudable characteristic 
of English civilized society. Eliot’s standard metaphoric language for 
analyzing demonstrations of anger serves as a visual reminder of the shared 
responsibility of individuals to effectively control this emotion when it 
strikes. What these common anger images seem to suggest is Eliot’s interest 
in the linguistic enactment of the cultural scripts that describe appropriate 
anger behaviours (a culture’s own ‘display rules’45 in the form of ‘role 
performances’46) to be learned, and ideally, acted out under trying 
circumstances. The ideal behaviour, in her ethical schema, involves 
cultivating emotional states that reflect and are driven by rational thoughts 
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and moderation. Of course, Eliot, as an English writer, and as a promulgator 
of realist aesthetics in particular, was not completely at liberty to invent 
radically new ways of conceptually representing socially-prescribed norms 
about the expression of anger. Her formation of ideas of self-control in 
Middlemarch will be shown to be principally based on instantly familiar 
configurations of anger—most prominently, but not exclusively, in terms of 
boiling or burning—that are mainly inspired by a reliance on analogies with 
the physical body, and produced reflexively rather than consciously or 
highly creatively.  
 
The figurative representations of anger are both conceptually 
recognisable and discursively creative. The result is a paradox of familiar 
innovation, which achieves embodied recognition as well as distinctive 
literary potency. For example, Eliot clearly depicts anger of a resentful kind 
in Middlemarch in her presentation of the emotional behaviour of Dorothea. 
Eliot’s use of this specific anger variant for both characterization and mood 
development is enhanced by a range of metaphoric elaborations, grounded 
in the longstanding belief that anger is prone to explode, to manifest itself as 
a sudden rush that is difficult to stop. Already during her honeymoon, 
Dorothea is disappointed with Casaubon’s emotional placidity, and is 
depressed by the prosaic servitude to which he has reduced her by 
commanding an intellectual debasement. Her marital expectations thwarted, 
Dorothea realizes that her initial perception of ‘some spiritual communion’ 
(M 22) with Casaubon was false, and this pang of awakening leads her to 
‘becoming more and more aware, with a certain terror, that her mind was 
continually sliding into inward fits of anger or repulsion, or else into forlorn 
weariness’ (M 196). Further, in using the expression ‘fits of anger’ here, 
which could be construed as an instance of the conceptual formulae anger is 
an illness, the narrator hints that Dorothea’s quick temper is a symptom of 
psychological deficiency, or lack of individual control. It is thereby implied 
that Dorothea is conditioned by social conventions to contain her ‘inward 
fire’ (M 14), to constantly monitor her emotional thermometer, the 
compulsory task the narrator repeatedly emphasizes to be contradictory to 
her nature, and the resulting impulses her flaw, at least in comparison with 
her more congenial sister Celia. Collectively, these expressions suggest that 
Dorothea and Casaubon’s marriage is a combustible one, and this evaluation 
can be made by way of extracting from a conventionally intricate 
metaphorical/metonymic pattern elements that make up the atmosphere of 
conflict. Dorothea, often against herself, shifts to making peace, motivated, 
it is implied, by an awareness of how an outburst of anger can generate 
destructive energy in a marriage. Her intentionally calculated anger 




discipline may be conceptualized metaphorically as a monitored release: 
‘anger can be let out under control’,47 a figurative category that can be 
modified, by conceptual analogy, to encompass deliberate restraint. The 
proposed extension of this principal metaphor—anger can be controllably 
suppressed—signifies Dorothea’s conscious suppression of this emotion in 
pursuit of domestic harmony: 
 
There had been no clashing of temper between Dorothea and her 
husband since that little explosion in Rome, which had left such 
strong traces in her mind that it had been easier ever since to 
quell emotion than to incur the consequence of venting it. (M 
282) 
 
Clearly the passage uses conventional language, which is a metaphoric 
seesaw of anger suppression and release: through Dorothea’s psychological 
resolve, a very specific—and rather predictable—chain of highly uniform 
anger conceptualizations is established (denoted by the persistence of this 
binary configuration). This chain places the reader under a condition of 
expectation. Once she returns home from her wedding journey, Dorothea is 
no longer capable of basing her attitude toward her husband on her respect 
for his superior knowledge and to continue the relationship in blind 
reverence. In the concomitant absence of emotional intimacy, her marriage 
becomes a sacrificial quest for devotion and understanding, a moral 
endeavour to respond in sympathy to her husband’s emotional and, it is 
hinted, sexual limitations. Intellectual and spiritual needs not being met, she 
commits herself to a life of emotional celibacy, adopting the role of a dutiful 
wife-martyr. So, the more then she is frustrated by Casaubon’s distrust in her 
pure intentions when he imposes on her his jealous prohibitions of her seeing 
Will Ladislaw, her confidant, but also, after all, his family relative. 
Frustration is bound to trigger Dorothea’s righteous anger, and as she comes 
to see her husband as ‘stupidly undiscerning and odiously unjust’ (M 282), 
the metaphor anger is bad weather inside a person gives us a clue that she 
has reached the most dangerous level of this emotion, beyond which it is 
impossible for her to ‘stride the blast’ of the ‘storm within her’ (M 282). 
Casaubon’s sanction of Ladislaw’s visits is a provocative stimulus for 
Dorothea’s automatic physiological and behavioural reactions that are 
visible signs of fury. Three of the commonly recognized symptoms of 
intense anger seem to be involved in Eliot’s metonymic representation of 
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Dorothea’s pent-up emotion: a change in voice; a flash of light in the eyes; 
and a verbal outburst directed at the offender:  
 
With her first words, uttered in a tone that shook him, she 
startled Mr Casaubon into looking at her, and meeting the flash 
of her eyes. 
‘Why do you attribute to me a wish for anything that would 
annoy you? You speak to me as if I were something you had to 
contend against. Wait at least till I appear to consult my own 
pleasure apart from yours.’ (M 282) 
 
Dorothea believes herself to be in the right, and receiving no apologies, she 
persists in anger, where the lack of appeasement is captured via the great 
generic anger is fire conceptual metaphor: ‘the fire was not dissipated yet’ 
(M 282). As it psychologically appears to her, in self-defence she ‘has at 
least attempted to assert herself and show the other to be wrong, and in thus 
relieving her feelings has at least declared her own position and so has taken 
a step towards re-establishing herself’.48 But the quarrel is not ultimately 
resolved in her favour; in fact, it appears to scale towards Casaubon’s side 
when he is shown to subdue his own wrath by trying to turn to his writing. 
We need only our human experience of bodily changes frequently attending 
this emotion to appreciate, and to make sense of, the metonymic designation 
of one distinguishing mark of anger, namely agitation: ‘his hand trembled so 
much that the words seemed to be written in an unknown character’ (M 282-
3). Casaubon is generally never shown to be given to excessive emotional 
expressions, and on this occasion he invests a great deal of mental effort to 
arrange his conduct around considerations of self-restraint, an effort that 
should not go undervalued, especially as his early suspicions towards 
Ladislaw prove to be not entirely unfounded at the novel’s climax.  
 
Eliot depicts Dorothea’s emotionally complex position via these 
figurative expressions of familiar embodied sensations and identifiable states 
of mind. Dorothea’s short-sighted conviction (short-sighted, because it is, 
like all her thoughts, ‘largely spun out of illusory suppositions’,49 rather than 
grounded in objective reality) that it is not her who is to blame for the tension 
in marriage, Casaubon’s ‘unresponsive hardness’ (M 425) being proof of her 
helpless entrapment, gives way to the display of an emotional behaviour that 
corresponds exactly with what Peter van Sommers metaphorically terms the 
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‘‘incubation’ of hostility’.50 She spends much time ruminating over what she 
stubbornly considers to be illegitimate reasons for Casaubon’s displeasure 
with her, exaggerating his insensitivity and expanding her own self-pity out 
of proportion. Since the narrative emphasis has been on Dorothea’s 
cultivation of ‘inward misery’ (M 426), it comes as no surprise that, when 
her dying husband rejects her gestures of genuine sympathy, Dorothea rages 
characteristically in the privacy of her room: 
 
She was in the reaction of a rebellious anger stronger than 
any she had felt since her marriage. Instead of tears there came 
words:— 
‘What have I done—what am I—that he should treat me so? 
He never knows what is in my mind—he never cares. What is 
the use of anything I do? He wishes he had never married me.’ 
(M 426) 
 
Dorothea takes Casaubon’s refusal to be comforted as a calculated 
insult that is beyond her endurance, and she remonstrates, in a fit of 
petulance, against her unrequited self-sacrifice as a wifely paragon who has 
laboured to perfect the act of giving in to please her husband. The eruption 
of Dorothea’s repressed anger takes place under the sudden impulse of 
rebellion, for up till now ‘she had never deliberately allowed her resentment 
to govern her in this way before’ (M 426). Access to her retaliatory anger 
that results from the perceived absence of due recognition from Casaubon is 
granted through both or either of two major image-schemas activated in the 
reader’s mind: that induced by a standard conceptualizing of anger as a loss 
of control over outside force and/or that invoked by a well-entrenched 
metaphor ‘anger is a social superior’.51 Perhaps by way of association with 
the idea that anger is an enemy, the ‘anger is an opponent (in a struggle)’52 
metaphor supplies an additional conceptual input for the metaphorical 
portrayal of how Will Ladislaw internally wrestles toward the novel’s end 
with having to renounce Dorothea due to his financial poverty, and hence his 
unsuitability as a future husband: 
 
He went and leaned on the back of the chair again, and seemed 
to be battling with his own anger, while she looked towards him 
sadly. (M 811) 
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It seems that the unconscious conjuring up of these schematic images is a 
prerequisite for understanding the emotion of anger being narrated which is 
always already steeped in our fixed and widely shared preconceptions about 
it. Metaphoric realism here is the novel’s inherent entanglement with the 
conceptual material that yields the standard folk practices of deriving 
meaning from set knowledge.   
 
Another example of Dorothea’s propensity for solitary anger outbursts 
behind locked doors is when she erroneously sees herself betrayed by Will 
Ladislaw and develops, in response to her ‘jealous offended pride’ (M 787), 
an unfair prejudice against him. Her anger, digested internally, is reinforced 
by the deployment of the conceptual metaphor ‘anger is fire’,53 which, beside 
‘anger is the heat of a fluid in a container’,54 (made distinctly perceptible by 
Aristotle55), is one of the two main subgroups of the mega-metaphor anger 
is heat:  
 
The fire of Dorothea’s anger was not easily spent, and it flamed 
out in fitful returns of spurning reproach. Why had he come 
obtruding his life into hers, hers that might have been whole 
enough without him? Why had he brought his cheap regard and 
his lip-born words to her who had nothing paltry to give in 
exchange? (M 787) 
 
This metaphor of anger as fire is probably ‘the central one’56 in our 
conventional view of anger, and probably as a result of this centrality the 
least creative one. But, at the same time, the lack of originality makes it 
somewhat easier for the reader to process, and subsequently to share more 
directly in Dorothea’s mental crisis. The ease of conceptual understanding 
here is partly attained by Eliot’s use of everyday language, and in the implicit 
knowledge of anger that we have already accumulated. If we were not 
already tacitly sensitized to the alliance of these cognates, Lakoff and 
Johnson conclude, we would not be able to think and talk about concepts as 
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we do, and ‘act according to the way we conceive of things’.57 Thus, the 
emotional connection with Dorothea is achieved through a metaphorical 
shortcut. In allowing herself to burn in ‘a private and self-absorbing 
despair’,58 that finds its articulation in ‘loud-whispered cries’ (M 787), 
Dorothea psychologically matches the profile of those suffering from jealous 
anger. Metaphorical clues aside, anger recognition in this narrative context 
also lies in the narrative context itself, essentially a reiteration of Mikhail 
Bakhtin and V. N. Vološinov’s idea that we can ascribe meaning to any 
speech act (and impute new connotations) by virtue of its antecedent history 
of use, and derive its ideological purport based on whatever normative sense 
of a lexical item has been customarily made in a given community and at 
given point in time.59 In other words, the reader’s ability to identify anger in 
Dorothea is as much a matter of seeing her within the embodied framework 
of anger, as it is seeing her in a situation that elicits from us a homogeneous 
notion of what constitutes the thoughts, feelings and behaviours typically 
associated with this emotion. 
 
The embodied realism of these anger episodes arises from the fact that 
anger metaphors are born out of the fully absorbed embodiment of this 
emotion (it builds up in increments and explodes when in excess) and the 
culturally encoded convention that it takes control like a social superior does. 
Lexically, Eliot induces in readers certain affective familiarity via 
conventional expressions, and by default she draws attention to the relatively 
stable conceptual core from which literary metaphors can be variously 
elaborated for particular effect. In such experientially-based mimetics, the 
conceptual content is very much an inception: it is a departure point, but not 
a destination; where it starts is in ‘known constructions [of concepts] and 
modes of expression’;60 where it ends is in their inventive range, original 
largely to the extent that the conservative realist discourse will allow 
aesthetic concessions, and variable according to the circumstantial 
specificity of a fictional action. There emerges, in other words, a possible 
rule of realistic expression, where a semantic variability (in the generation 
of metaphor) does not in principle occur outside a habitual nuclei: of biology 
and culture.  
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It is possible that Eliot’s predilection in Middlemarch for the use of 
conventional primary metaphors (whether based on embodied experience or 
other routine cognitions) would be dismissed as accidental on the grounds 
that they have been used quite randomly, rather than remarkably 
consistently, and therefore do not constitute sufficiently representative 
examples, and less so exemplify the sort of narrative realism they have been 
proposed to enact. But there is evidence in the text to discount this 
possibility. For instance, an even more extreme case of anger than 
Dorothea’s, the mighty wrath of Will Ladislaw which metonymically 
engulfs his whole body in predictable ways is transmitted metaphorically via 
some staple source domains in nevertheless imaginative collocations. When 
Dorothea accidentally catches Will in an intimate, though completely 
innocent conversation with Rosamond, his blood is up once he realizes he 
has become a victim of intrigue. A series of stock metonymic expressions 
are collectively highly suggestive of Will’s extreme, impulsive anger. In 
order of appearance they are: ‘aggressive verbal behavior stands for anger’,61 
the change of colour in the face stands for anger and ‘aggressive visual 
behavior stands for anger’ ,62 with the concomitant embodied metonymic 
sensation of tingling:  
 
‘Don’t touch me!’ he said, with an utterance like the cut of a 
lash, darting from her, and changing from pink to white and back 
again, as if his whole frame were tingling with the pain of the 
sting. He wheeled round to the other side of the room and stood 
opposite to her, with the tips of his fingers in his pockets and his 
head thrown back, looking fiercely not at Rosamond but at a 
point a few inches away from her. (M 777) 
 
A desire for confrontation is intrinsic to anger, as this emotion is 
evolutionarily designed psychologically ‘to help us deal with setbacks, with 
things that thwart us from pursuing what we want, and with a range of threats 
to our survival. Anger prepares us to engage—to force a change—and it does 
this by getting our bodies ready for action’.63 Will’s anger comes as a 
response to his recognition that his already limited prospect of an imagined 
future life with Dorothea has now practically diminished to an impossibility. 
His frustrated disappointment, like Dorothea’s in regard to Casaubon, helps 
explain why Will is on the threshold of attacking Rosamond verbally, 
thereby attenuating his proper behavioural control. Two conceptual 
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metaphors deployed—anger is a heavy object and anger is an accumulated 
force that needs releasing—function jointly (and in conjunction with the 
following simile of the panther) to signal the forthcoming abuse, heaped as 
punishment and released for the purpose of relief: 
 
It would have been safer for Will in the first instance to have taken up 
his hat and gone away; but he had felt no impulse to do this; on the contrary, 
he had a horrible inclination to stay and shatter Rosamond with his anger. It 
seemed as impossible to bear the fatality she had drawn down on him without 
venting his fury as it would be to a panther to bear the javelin-wound without 
springing and biting (M 778). 
 
Will’s anger is at its highest point, and the significance attached to his 
failed impulse control is that of contemporary concerns with social etiquette 
and standards of conduct. The protocol of Victorian polite society ensured 
that irascible gentlemen were viewed with disdain and severely judged their 
unguarded anger. This is suggested in the herculean effort that Will is 
represented as making to restrain his violent outburst.64 Through the ‘intense 
anger produces steam’65 and ‘anger is a dangerous animal’66 conceptual 
metaphors, Eliot creates a complex figurative moment of anger inhibition: 
 
He was fuming under a repressive law which he was forced to 
acknowledge: he was dangerously poised, and Rosamond’s 
voice now brought the decisive vibration. (M 778) 
 
If it had not been for the sound of Rosamond’s voice, Will, more than likely, 
would have limited himself to meaningful words of counsel and a cordial 
termination of their friendship. But Rosamond bites back with an icy retort, 
and her speech only provides further fuel that reignites Will’s anger. 
Provoked by Rosamond’s deliberate sarcasm, Will lashes out despite himself 
and against prevailing norms of self-restraint. To mark this angry explosion, 
that is, to make it mentally accessible through the provision of its ‘image-
schematic structure’67—an implicit aim which becomes an ultimate 
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condition of figurative mimetics—the narrator marshals a range of clichéd 
metonymic and metaphoric expressions with the effect of indexing Will’s 
state of mind as currently beneath that of individuals graced by so-called 
excellent character. In an image of a split self, he is ‘ready to curse her’ (M 
778), thereby acting beyond his conscious control, and against his better 
judgment. On hearing Rosamond’s sardonic suggestion that he pursue 
Dorothea and declare his preference, Will furiously exclaims: ‘‘Go after 
her!’ he burst out, with a sharp edge in his voice’ (M 778). Will’s vocal 
expression of anger is accompanied by a display of animal-like intent at 
physical injury: ‘He began to move about with the restlessness of a wild 
animal that sees prey but cannot reach it’ (M 778). Rosamond’s 
condescending tone gives new impetus to Will’s otherwise subsiding anger: 
‘He found another vent for his rage by snatching up Rosamond’s words 
again, as if they were reptiles to be throttled and flung off’ (M 778). As might 
be expected of a man socially trained to display the kind of behaviour 
associated with good manners and cultivated taste, Will calms down and 
even attempts a gesture of reconciliation. Before he takes leave of 
Rosamond, we are told, ‘he felt checked and stultified in his anger’ (M 779), 
though as the narrator adds by use of the ‘anger is fire’68 metaphor, ‘the 
vindictive fire was still burning in him, and he could utter no word of 
retraction’ (M 779). The narrator, just a moment earlier, had insisted that it 
be 
 
forgiven to Will that he had no such movement of pity. He had 
felt no bond beforehand to this woman [Rosamond] who had 
spoiled the ideal treasure of his life, and he held himself 
blameless. He knew that he was cruel, but he had no relenting in 
him yet (M 779).   
 
From this remark, Eliot reflects that it was considered in Victorian culture to 
be pardonable (if justified), even acceptable (if instructive), to engage in a 
certain cruelty involved in righteous anger, but one had to overcome 
venomous feelings, as Will eventually does, if one’s proper emotional 
decorum were to be maintained.  
 
These examples suggest that there is nothing discernibly 
unconventional in the way Eliot narrates the experience of anger serially in 
Middlemarch, but collectively, they are narratively distinctive, and can be 
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seen to be substantial contributors to the effect of the text’s conceptual and 
emotional realism. The remarkable consistency of metaphoric constructions 
in terms of heat that exerts pressure on a container, causing it to eventually 
explode, provides linguistic proof that the subconscious organization and 
categorization of anger does not occur in a novelistic context in an ad hoc 
manner, but rather is based on what is universally known and individually 
experienced about the physiology of anger. What is known, and felt (and 
sometimes observed in others) comprises a necessary restriction—‘the 
constraining effect of universal embodiment’,69 as Kövecses calls it—that 
provides the cognitive motivation for metaphorically projecting anger in 
exactly this way. Undeniably, the scope of conceptual thinking about anger 
in Middlemarch extends beyond the instances of the great generic metaphor 
‘the angry person is a pressurized container’.70 We have seen how Eliot 
effectively makes use of other main (archetypal) metaphors for anger that 
are widespread in everyday English language, by resorting to familiar 
idiomatic expressions that have been long recognized and neatly assembled 
together by cognitive linguists into the unitary metaphors anger is a social 
superior, anger is an opponent (in a struggle) or anger is a dangerous animal. 
Notwithstanding the rich variety in Eliot’s selection of metaphorical source 
domains to depict anger, her default choices seem to be those that are 
demonstrably sub-metaphors, or satellite instantiations, of the anger is heat 
master-metaphor, and which are intelligible primarily in the light of that 
metaphor. The implication is that there is no single identifiable origin or 
source from which spring Eliot’s ways of conceptualizing anger, but rather 
there are many such motivations, not distinctly cultural—the experiential 
sensation of embodied anger being the most dominant. Any hypothesis that 
Eliot’s imaginative creativity may typically proceed outside these 
‘presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared 
. . . by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their 
understanding of that world and their behaviour in it’,71 would be discounted 
by the sheer volume of the novel’s metaphors of anger whose strikingly 
consistent design suggests something much more than chance. On the 
contrary, their regularity and interpretive resonance points to a conceptual 
understanding of narrated mental states that governs the representation (and 
endorsement) of a commitment to emotional sophistication through the 
practice of self-restraint.  
 
                                                 
69 Kövecses, ‘Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger,’ 162. 
70 Ibid., 157. 
71 Quinn and Holland, ‘Culture and Cognition,’ 3–40; qtd. Radden, ‘How 
Metonymic are Metaphors?’ 102. 




This regime of conceptual understanding is the building block upon which 
embodied realism is based, one unit, amongst possible others, of mimetic 
construction. The particular pre-comprehensibility of the experience-
motivated metaphors of anger testifies to what Margaret H. Freeman has 
already pursued in her cognitive/linguistically-informed theory of literature, 
expressly that ‘literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their 
interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the 
physical and socio-cultural worlds in which they have been created and are 
read’.72 To the extent that the figurative language of emotion in Middlemarch 
solicits the information from the physiological attributes and behaviour that 
have come to characterize the Victorian conception of anger, the novel is 
calculated to orient its recipients toward established conceptual frameworks 
in an act of enforcing emotional vigilance. This is why narrative realism is 
said here to be discursively embodied. But embodied realism is discursively 
realist not because the reader is believed to automatically make sense of 
modalized anger metaphors, but because it involves us in a text that includes 
instantaneously decodifiable metaphoric language necessary for sense 
making. The characters and situations of Middlemarch are realistic precisely 
because Eliot artfully deploys metaphors that are individually both familiar 
and emotionally resonant, and collectively managed into complex discursive 
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